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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on the reliability and availability analysis of Web service (WS)
compositions, orchestrated via the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL). Starting from
the failure profiles of the services being composed, which take into account multiple possible
failure modes, latent errors, and propagation effects, and from a BPEL process description,
we provide an analytical technique for evaluating the composite process’ reliability-availability
metrics. This technique also takes into account BPEL’s advanced composition features, including
fault, compensation, termination, and event handling. The method is a design-time aid that can
help users and third party providers reason, in the early stages of development, and in particular
during WS selection, about a process’ reliability and availability. A non-trivial case study in the
area of travel management is used to illustrate the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
Index Terms
Web service, business process execution language, fault propagation, fault compensation
and termination, event handling.
F
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BPEL Business Process Execution Language
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
DTMC Discrete Time Markov Chain
• The authors are with the Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy.
E-mail: {salvatore.distefano,carlo.ghezzi,sam.guinea,raffaela.mirandola}@polimi.it
April 1, 2014 DRAFT
TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. X, NO. X, JUNE 2014 2
FCT Fault, Compensation and Termination
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
QoS Quality of Service
rv Random Variable
SOA Service Oriented Architecture
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
UDDI Universal Description Discovery and Integration
WS Web Service
WSDL Web Services Description Language
NOTATION
γX response probability of activity X (γXU user, γXA architect)
AWSC WS container’s availability
αWSS WS inner service response probability
nl number of latent error inputs or outputs
nf number of faulty inputs or outputs
n number of total inputs or outputs (n = 1 + nl + nf )
PX propagation matrix of activity X (PXU user, PXA architect, architect γ-propagation
matrix PXAγ )
PXcl correct-latent error block propagation matrix of activity X
PXf fault block propagation matrix of activity X
InX input vector of activity X(InX
U
user, InX
A
architect)
InX normalized input vector of activity X on the nl+1 correct-latent error inputs
OX output vector of activity X
OX normalized output vector of activity X on the nl+1 correct-latent error inputs OX =
{(InX ·PXcl )/(pXok),0}
Ik k-order identity matrix
pXok probability of a non-faulty output of x, pok =
∑nl
j=0O
X [j]
CX correctness, probability that X produces a correct output given it was correctly
invoked
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EXi error probability that an execution of X with correct input returns an error mode
1 < i ≤ nl as output
GXj fault probability that a correct invocation of X triggers the 1 < j ≤ nl + 1 fault
BXi error robustness, probability that X , invoked with error mode 0 < i ≤ nl as input,
masks the error and returns a correct output
SEXi error susceptibility, probability that X , invoked with error mode 0 < i ≤ nl as input,
produces a latent error output
SFXi fault susceptibility, probability that X , invoked with error mode 0 < i ≤ nl as input,
produces a fault output
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS
Service orientation has played an extremely important role in the evolution of Infor-
mation Technology in the last decade. It provides the foundations for some of today’s
most significant advancements, such as Web 2.0, Cloud computing, and the Internet
of Things. The service abstraction imposes that we rethink methods and techniques
for developing and managing both physical (i.e. hardware infrastructure) and logical
systems (i.e. software architecture). In the former case, we speak of Service Oriented
Infrastructure, while in the latter we speak of Service Oriented Architecture.
The term Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) refers to an ecosystem [1] of interacting
processes, physical nodes, and people that create, manage, and provide functionalities
as services. According to this perspective, a business process is a complex service that
combines simpler, loosely coupled, reusable Web services (WSs) using service orchestra-
tion. Service orchestrations are often implemented using workflow languages that provide
mechanisms for selecting and composing services through the definition of complex
control- and data-flows. The Web Services Business Process Execution Language (BPEL)
is the de-facto standard workflow language [2] for SOA.
In this paper, we focus on service reliability and availability, and discuss how they can
be properly addressed at design-time when composing services with the BPEL language.
The ability to perform an early assessment of these qualities, instead of waiting for the
implementation and runtime stages, is a key challenge for SOA architectures, and a key
factor when implementing dependable software.
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In SOA, WSs are owned by different providers, and used as black boxes. To support
service selection, providers expose WS properties in specific Web-accessible registries.
Selection is then implemented as a query to the registry that returns the services that
are known to match a specific set of requirements. This approach allows us to choose
among different alternatives, as long as the providers explicitly specify QoS information
about their WSs (e.g., reliability, availability, and performance).
However, even if QoS information is available, how the orchestration will be carried
out cannot be entirely foreseen at design time. It will depend on many different aspects,
such as the availability of the involved services, how the services respond, the status of
the network, unexpected error conditions, etc. Non-functional properties are a crucial
concern in composite process orchestration, and architectural decisions, such as WS
selection and workflow structuring, always affect the QoS of the resulting process.
We advocate that, thanks to SOA, designers can reason on BPEL process reliability
and availability at a high level of abstraction. We expect well-founded methods to be
available to compute whether the non-functional aspects of the WSs we include in a
composition satisfy the reliability and availability requirements we have for the process.
We have investigated failures in component based systems in previous work [3], [4]. In
this work, we considered multiple failure modes, as well as the emergence, propagation,
and transformation of errors in a running system’s data and control flows, and how
these can eventually lead to a failure.
BPEL processes can be affected by many different failure modes, because they orches-
trate and aggregate services that come from different providers. They mix multi-tier
and heterogeneous domains, as well as different approaches and technologies, through
the use of interoperable interfaces. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to provide a
technique for evaluating the reliability and availability of composite services, with a
complete coverage of the BPEL language. We want to understand reliability, availability,
response probability, and propagation phenomena. To gain this understanding, we take
into account the service parameter values and the definition of the process, with its
fault, compensation, termination (FCT), and event handling. To reach this goal, we have
revised and extended our previous work in light of the SOA application domain, and
we have identified, and specified, both the phenomena that we want to observe, and
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the parameters that allow us to quantify them.
Several approaches have been developed in the past to model and evaluate the
reliability and availability of composite processes (as we discuss in Section 2). However,
to the best of our knowledge, none of them adequately takes into account FCT and event
handling, which are typical of BPEL composite processes, and none of them considers
these aspects in conjunction with propagation phenomena. Furthermore, our proposed
technique is lightweight and scalable. The number of computational operations grows
linearly with the number of BPEL process activities. This feature will enable us in
the future to use the technique to predict reliability and availability anomalies and
violations, and to effectively support service providers in decision making.
2 RELATED WORK
Many different aspects of Web-based systems have been studied over the last few
years, such as workload characterization, performance, availability, and reliability. Our
work proposes an approach to analyze the reliability and availability of Web service
compositions, orchestrated via the BPEL workflow language. We base our method
on the software reliability engineering approach [5], and propose an early design-
time reliability assessment, to prevent late fault discovery. In particular, we provide
an analytical evaluation that takes into account multiple possible failure modes, latent
errors, and propagation effects.
Recently, with the emergence of self-adaptive architectures, several approaches have
been proposed in literature to deal with self-healing business processes [6], [7]. Although
our approach is mainly focused on design-time evaluation, its extension to support run-
time self adaptation is currently being investigated.
In our previous work [3], [4], we addressed the stochastic evaluation of reliability
in component-based systems, and we considered multiple failure modes and failure
propagation phenomena. Other related work is presented hereafter, classified in three
main areas, described next.
Web-based availability and reliability. Discrete time Markov chains (DTMC) have
often been used in literature [8], [9], [10] as suitable models for system analysis. A
hierarchical approach for e-business systems has been proposed in [8]; [9] presented a
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model of an e-commerce site in which user navigation patterns were represented; in [10]
Web user activity was modeled as an on-off process combined with a Markov process.
An empirical analysis of Web system availability from the end-user’s perspective is
presented in [11].
Related work on Web services’ availability and reliability includes several papers with
analytical models (e.g., [9], [12]), and empirical studies (e.g. [13]). The analytical models
exploit different kinds of Markov processes to define availability and reliability models
for a composite Web service. The empirical analyses consider both the workloads and the
reliability of Web servers, and distinguish between inter-session and intra-session Web
characteristics [13]. More recently, some papers have tackled the problem of composing
a service-oriented system from publicly available Web services (e.g., [14]), taking into
account different types of Web service failures.
Architecture-based reliability. Architecture-based software reliability analysis has
been dealt with in several papers, and specific surveys on this topic can be found
in [15], [16]. These papers mainly focus on evaluating the overall system reliability
by taking into account the internal failure of each component, and the probabilities of
their interactions. Interesting empirical studies, and works that deal with uncertainty
analysis of architecture-based software reliability, can be found in [17], and [18]. Among
the existing works in the area, the ones that mostly influenced our work are briefly
summarized below. In 1980, Cheung [19] proposed the so called user-oriented reliability
approach, and defined it as the probability to observe a correct output from a program,
given a representative set of input data from the external environment. Here, system
reliability is derived using a stochastic Markov process that describes the system as a set
of interacting components, expressed as a function of the component reliability, and of
utilization. In the area of self-assembly service-oriented computing, Grassi [21] proposed
an approach for automatic reliability estimation that exploits the compositional aspects
that are inherent in these applications, and their dependency on external sources. Error
propagation among components is completely neglected in these works.
The work of [22] is one of the first papers in this area. It proposes a graph theory-based
reduction approach for the evaluation of software’s non-functional properties, such as
its reliability and performance. Later, several other applications of this technique were
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proposed in different contexts (DTMC [23], workflow [24], [25], etc.). [24], [25] also dealt
with WS and business processes adopting the reduction technique; however, they do
not consider different failure modes and corresponding propagation aspects.
Error propagation. In [27], error propagation probability is defined as the probability
that an error, after manifesting itself, will propagate through components, and possibly
end up visible at the user interface level. This definition is limited to a single type of
failure, and in [27] it is supported by a methodology and a tool capable of analyzing the
sensibility of each component, with respect to failure and error propagation. Different
approaches based on fault injection have been applied to estimate error propagation in
software systems during the testing phase (e.g., [28]).
3 OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
Design/selection/
composition
Flattening
Synthesis/Analysis
BPEL/  
WS Provider 
Parameters
Flat 
Workflow
Results/
Process 
Parameters
Software 
Architect
End User
Inputs/
Countermeasures
WS 
Discovery 
Tool
WS Architect 
Parameters
WS 
End User 
Parameters
Fig. 1. The processing schema
The aim of this work is to evaluate the overall reliability and availability parameters
of a composite business process described in BPEL [2], knowing its internal control-
and data-flows, and the non-functional properties of its participating services.
As shown in Fig. 1, these systems have two main kinds of stakeholders, each with
its own interests: the end user, and the software architect. From the user’s point of view,
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the goal is to select the service that best fits the requirements; from the architect’s point
of view, the goal is to implement the best possible process by composing the available
services. Specifically, the differences in the users’ and architect’s objectives impose that
the technique be flexible with respect to the parameters it will consider. This flexibility
strongly depends on how and what is considered as correct, or faulty, for each WS
interaction. For example, starting from the taxonomy of [29], WS faults or errors can be
managed internally by a process, and returned to the user as valid outputs, or they can
be directly forwarded to the user as errors.
We propose to organize the process evaluation into three steps, as shown in Fig. 1.
i) Design-selection-composition - In this step, a composite service is designed by orches-
trating external WSs. External Web services are selected for composition via specific
discovery tools (e.g. Universal Description Discovery and Integration registries, WS portals,
or WS search engines), according to their functional and non-functional properties
and to how we expect them to contribute to the properties of the composition. The
process design is usually performed by a software architect, who must be aware of the
semantics of the functional and non-functional parameters to be considered. Because
the technique we propose provides an analytical solution, it is necessary to specify an
adequate formulation of the problem, and to define appropriate metrics and parameters,
as discussed in Section 4.
ii) Flattening - The BPEL process includes nested subprocesses or activities, and man-
ages faults and events through specific FCT and event handlers. To deal with this
issue, the hierarchically structured BPEL process, and the non-functional properties of
its services and internal activities have to be transformed into a flat workflow. Unlike the
BPEL process, the flat workflow only has one termination. This step is required and is
non-trivial, as we will discuss in Section 5.
iii) Synthesis and Analysis - The overall non-functional properties of the BPEL process
are evaluated in terms of the properties of the individual services that are orchestrated
by the workflow. Aggregation-reduction rules and sensitivity analyses are applied, as
described in Section 6.
The results can be fed back to the software architect, who can then modify the original
process, either using the same services or by selecting new ones. If the results are
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satisfactory, they can be published to a service registry and made available for further
selection and composition. The analysis technique can be used both at design and run
time, because it has a low complexity1. A way to use the technique could be to identify
the WSs that have a large impact on the process’ reliability metrics, using sensitivity
and importance analysis, as explained in the example discussed in Section 7, or to infer
the properties of one or more components given the requirements on the whole process.
4 WS SELECTION AND COMPOSITION: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
To evaluate the reliability and availability of a composite BPEL process, we need to
take into account a detailed view of the overall software architecture. Fig. 2a illustrates
the four main server components involved in the deployment and execution of a BPEL
process, while Fig. 2b highlights the architecture from both the end user’s and the
architect’s perspectives.
The Web service is the basic building block of a service-oriented system. It is the
smallest composable unit, and therefore should be designed to maximize reusability.
The SOAP engine is responsible for de-serializing incoming requests, for providing them
to a service instance, and for serializing outgoing responses (e.g., Apache Axis). In
the case of composed WSs, the SOAP engine is usually part of a more sophisticated
execution environment called the BPEL engine, a centralized environment for executing
and managing composite processes. Typically, the SOAP and BPEL engines are part
of an application server (e.g. Jakarta Tomcat) that provides a place to hold applications
that must be accessed by different clients. Some application servers already include
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) functionality; otherwise we also need a Web server,
which is a software capable of handling HTTP messages (e.g., Apache HTTP Server).
End users are not capable of distinguishing between correct versus faulty service
responses and correct versus faulty BPEL or SOAP WS responses; their view of the
WS stack is composed of solely three layers: the HTTP server, the application server,
and the BPEL and SOAP engine-service. On the other hand, software architects are
aware of the composite service’s intended logic, and know how to distinguish service
1. It scales (sub-)linearly with respect to the number of the process elements-; see Section 6.3
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SOAP Engine
BPEL Engine
Application Server
HTTP (Web) Server
Application Server
HTTP (Web) Server
SOAP Engine
Network
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Application Server
HTTP (Web) Server
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(a) Process
End User
App. 
Server
HTTP
Server
BPEL/
SOAP
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Server
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Server
BPEL/
SOAP
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Software
Architect
(b) Perspectives
Fig. 2. WS stack, process WS composition (a), and response’s perspectives (b).
responses from engine responses; therefore, they are interested in composing processes
that provide adequate responses when invoked. Thus, from the architect’s perspective,
the full WS stack needs to be considered.
A WS system can be formally described as follows.
Definition 1: A WS system WS is characterized by the pair
< γWS,PWS >
where
• γWS ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R is the WS response probability, i.e. the probability the WS system
will provide a response; and
• PWS ∈ [0, 1]n ⊂ Rn×[0, 1]n ⊂ Rn is the propagation matrix, including the probabilities
that the input of WS is propagated to the output, where n is the number of total
possible (correct, latent error, or fault) inputs and outputs.
We can further characterize the previous definition according to the two identified per-
spectives, obtaining < γWSU ,PWSU > in the case of end users (U ), and < γWSA ,PWSA >
for architects (A).
A similar formalization is adopted for BPEL’s internal activities, thus representing an
internal activity Act by a pair < γAct,PAct >.
It is important to understand these parameters in terms of the architecture of Fig. 1.
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Response probability: Response probability can be defined as
γWS = Pr{The whole WS system provides a response}.
According to Fig. 2a, a WS system can be decomposed into two parts: the WS container
(HTTP Server, Application server, BPEL and SOAP engines), and the service itself. The
former is in charge of forwarding the request to the latter, which in turn performs
the actual processing, and returns a result. Because the container does not actually
process the request, we are mainly interested in its readiness, i.e. the capability to forward
messages to and from the service. The service, on the other hand, has to elaborate the
request, and therefore we have to quantify its capability to operate.
Avizienis et al. [29] define availability as the readiness for correct service, and relia-
bility as the continuity of correct service. Following this approach, we can identify and
characterize the WS container’s availability AWSC as its readiness to provide access to the
actual service. This is why, when we calculate the WS response probability, we need to
consider the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of its inner service’s i) time to failure
FWSS (·) (or reliability RWSS (·) = 1− FWSS (·)), and ii) time to response TWSS (·). Assuming
the container and the inner service time to failure are statistically independent, we can
express the WS response probability as
γWS = Pr{The WS container is available, and the inner service provides a response}.
There are three reasons why a WS container can become unavailable: i) it can suffer
from HTTP (Web) server failures and unavailability, ii) the Application Server may not
be able to dispatch service requests, or iii) there may be errors in the BPEL-SOAP Engine.
In the first two cases, the system generates and delivers an HTTP error message (e.g.
400, 404, 500, 502, 503) to the user. In the third case, a specific SOAP fault message is
delivered to the user. In composed WSs, inter-component communication problems are
detected by the innermost engine, i.e. the SOAP engine. That is why they are considered
errors in the BPEL-SOAP engine.
The service container’s availability AWSC is therefore the probability that the HTTP
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server, the Application server, and the BPEL-SOAP engines are working correctly:
AWSC (t) = Pr{The servers and the engines are working at t}.
Assuming that availability reaches a steady state after a transient, we can characterize
these quantities using single values, i.e. the steady state availability AWSC = lim
t→∞
AWSC (t).
More specifically, if AWSHTTP , A
WS
AS , and A
WS
BPEL−SOAP are the steady state availabilities of
the HTTP (Web) server, the Application server, and the BPEL-SOAP engine, respectively,
the container service availability is AWSC = A
WS
HTTPA
WS
AS A
WS
BPEL−SOAP .
If the WS container is available, the WS’s response probability will depend on the
inner service actually providing the response, i.e. its response probability is strongly
related to the inner service’s operation continuity or reliability. If Q is the inner service’s
lifetime, then
RWSS (q) = Pr{The service is working in [0, q]} = Pr{Q > q} = 1− FWSS (q)
where FWSS (q) is the inner service failure CDF. However, we are specifically interested
in the service’s response probability αWSS , which only refers to the inner service of a WS,
and does not take into account the WS container, thus yielding
γWS = AWSC α
WS
S . (1)
To correctly characterize αWSS , we need to distinguish between the user’s and the
architect’s perspectives. The user is interested in the behavior of the WS stack (see Fig.
2b), up until the BPEL-SOAP engine. We consider a valid response to be one that is
received by the BPEL-SOAP engine, be it a service response or a BPEL-SOAP fault. On
the other hand, for an architect, a response is only considered valid if it arrives from the
service, be it correct or faulty. Thus, if Y is the inner service’s time-to-response random
variable (rv) with CDF FWSY (y), we can define the user service response probability as
αWS
U
S (y) = Pr{The service provide a response or a BPEL-SOAP error occurs}
= Pr{The service provides a response}+ Pr{A BPEL-SOAP error occurs}
−Pr{The service provides a response and a BPEL-SOAP error occurs}.
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The inner service provides a response if it is reliable during the request processing,
i.e., during the service mission time. Thus, assuming the software is not affected by aging,
i.e. we only consider random failure causes that do not depend on the service’s age,
we have that Pr{The service provides a response} = Pr{T > y|Y ≤ y}. This way, if
the inner service time-to-failure and time-to-response random variables are statistically
independent, we have that αWSUS (y) = R
WS
S (y) + E
WS
BPEL−SOAP − RWSS (y)EWSBPEL−SOAP ,
where EWSBPEL−SOAP is the probability of a BPEL-SOAP error. The reader can refer to
[14], [30], [31] for insights into the evaluation of EWSBPEL−SOAP .
From the architect’s viewpoint, the inner service’s response probability is
αWS
A
S (y) = Pr{The service provides a response} = RWSS (y).
Considering the mean time-to-response y =
∫∞
0
yTWSY (y)dy, we define α
WSU
S , and α
WSA
S
as αWSUS = α
WSU
S (y) = R
WS
S (y) + E
WS
BPEL−SOAP − RWSS (y)EWSBPEL−SOAP , and αWSAS =
αWS
A
S (y) = R
WS
S (y). Thus, the WS’s response probability γ
WS , defined by (1), is γWSU =
AWSC α
WSU
S for the user’s perspective, and γ
WSA = AWSC α
WSA
S for the architect’s perspec-
tive.
Propagation matrix: The second means we use to characterize our WS system is
the process’ propagation matrix, which is the matrix containing the probabilities that
certain inputs will be propagated to certain outputs.
The main difference between an abstract workflow and a WS is that a workflow only
has two possible outputs: it can be either correct, or erroneous. A WS, on the other
hand, can distinguish between correct and faulty outputs, and discriminate amongst
faults by returning fault messages. These faults correspond to errors that are detected
during elaboration, and managed by the process through specific handlers. There are
however cases in which a process can generate an error that is not detected. Thus,
following the taxonomy presented in [29], an error can also be undetected or latent.
Some examples of undetected-latent service errors are QoS violations, errors related to
functional correctness (e.g., wrong currency in payments, truncated names or strings,
valid but wrong credit numbers or credentials, etc.), and errors in the WS stack (e.g.,
data corruption without consequences on the format, default parameters or responses
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or both, etc.). Moreover, a process can also terminate before reaching the end of the
workflow by invoking specific BPEL exit activities, which we characterize as early exits.
We specify the propagation probability matrix as
PWS =
[
PWS[i, j] = Pr{Output = j| Input = i and the inner service provides a response}]
where i, j = 0, .., n specify the input and output types (i = 0 identifies the correct input,
j = 0 identifies the desired output, 0 < i, j ≤ n identify erroneous inputs and outputs).
PWS[i, j] therefore represents the probability that a given input of type i is modified by
the WS processing into an output of type j. This probability value could be statistically
obtained by observing and classifying the WS output assuming the input is always of
type i, for example by adopting fault propagation analysis techniques [32]. It is thus
necessary to compare the actual output to the desired one, to detect the processing
flaw, and to identify and classify, if possible, the output type. This action requires a
clear, unambiguous input-output type classification, i.e. it should not occur that two
inputs (or two outputs) of a specific WS are undistinguishable or similar.
If nl is the number of latent errors, and nf is the number of explicit errors or faults
and early exits, then n is equal to nl + nf + 1 (1 is for the correct input-output), and
matrix PWS can be represented as a block matrix
PWS =
 PWScl PWSf
0nf×nl+1 Inf
 (2)
where PWScl (nl+1×nl+1 ) and PWSf (nl+1×nf ) are the matrices that probabilistically
represent the propagation of a correct-latent error input to the output. PWScl contains
the correct-latent error propagation probabilities, while PWSf expresses the fault or early
exit ones. Assuming an incoming fault can be forwarded by the service as it is, 0 is
a (nf × nl + 1)-dimension matrix of 0s representing the probability that a faulty input
is propagated to a correct or latent error output. Inf is the identity matrix of order nf ,
meaning that an incoming fault is propagated as it is to the output, with probability 1.
The structure of the propagation matrix differs according to the perspective. From the
end user’s perspective the BPEL-SOAP fault is still considered to be a valid response. It
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is a kind of error that returns the control to the users, i.e. it can be viewed in the model
as a further fault. In algebraic terms, to obtain the user propagation matrix PWSU , we
need to add a row and a column to PWS of (2). This action leads us to the n+1×n+1
matrix
PWS
U
=
 αWSUS PWScl αWSUS PWSf (1− αWSUS )1nl+1×1
0nf+1×nl+1 Inf+1

where 11×nl+1 is a (1× nl + 1)−vector of 1s, and Inf+1 is the nf + 1-identity matrix.
As discussed in [19], the reliability of a component strictly depends on its usage. In
our framework, a process or WS usage profile has to be characterized with respect to
the set of failure modes. The usage profile or input vector InWS of a process or WS is an
n-element stochastic vector. Its ith element InWS[i] represents the probability that the
input of WS carries the (correct or erred) response mode i. Because the WS manages
faults, it is not possible to have faults as inputs. As a result, InWS[i] = 0 ∀i = nl+1, .., n
or InWS = {InWS,0}, where InWS is a stochastic vector of nl + 1 elements, and 0 is a
vector of nf 0.
Furthermore, InWS
A
= InWS (, and PWSA = PWS), InWS
U
= {InWS, 0} because, from
the user’s point of view, we need to include an input for the BPEL-SOAP fault.
Aggregated Parameters: Starting from γX and PX , we can derive the aggregated
properties for a generic activity X , which could be either a WS WS or an internal
activity Act, as reported in Table I.
Because
∑n
j=0P
X [i, j] = 1, from BXi , SEXi , and SFXi formulae, we have that ∀i| 0 <
i ≤ nl BXi + SEXi + SFXi = γX .
In case of a WS WS, the above metrics are valid both from the user and the architect
perspectives. Corresponding formulae can be obtained by just substituting the related
parameters (γWSU , PWSU , InWS
U
or γWSA , PWSA , InWS
A
, respectively) into the formulae
of Table I.
Assumptions: The overall approach relies on the following key assumptions.
i) Container and inner service time-to-failure are statistically independent.
ii) Inner service time-to-response and time-to-failure are statistically independent.
iii) All branching activities, i.e. any activity with inner conditions (branches and
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TABLE I
Aggregated parameter definitions.
Par. Formula Description
CX - Correctness PX [0, 0]γX = PXcl [0, 0]γ
X probability that X produces a correct output given it was
invoked providing a correct input
EXi - ith error proba-
bility P
X [0, i]γX = PXcl [0, i]γ
X probability that a correct invocation/execution of X returns
with an error mode i with 0 < i ≤ nl
GXj - jth fault proba-
bility
PX [0, nl + j]γ
X =
PXf [0, j]γ
X
the probability that a correct invocation triggers the jth fault on
X with 0 < j ≤ nf
BXi - ith error robust-
ness P
X [i, 0]γX = PXcl [i, 0]γ
X the probability that X , invoked with an error mode i, 0 < i ≤ nl,
masks the error and returns a correct output
SEXi - ith error sus-
ceptibility
γX · ∑nlj=1PX [i, j] =
γX
∑nl
j=1P
X
cl [i, j]
probability that X , invoked with an error mode i, 0 < i ≤ nl,
produces an erroneous output
SFXi - ith fault sus-
ceptibility
γX · ∑nfj=1PX [i, nl + j] =
γX
∑nf
j=1P
X
f [i, j]
probability that X , invoked with an error mode i, 0 < i ≤ nl,
produces a fault output
LXi - ith proclivity γX
∑n
h=0 In
X [h]PX [h, i]
probability that X produces the ith error mode (0 < i ≤ nl)
or fault output (nl < i ≤ nf ) given InX . In the former case
(0 < i ≤ nl), we refer to error proclivity, while in the latter case
(nl < i ≤ nf ) we refer to fault proclivity.
loops), can be probabilistically represented.
iv) Input and output types need to be distinguishable. Given an input or output
activity of type i (In[i]orO[i]), ∀j ∈ [1, n]|i 6= j it is true that In[i] 6= In[j] or O[i] 6= O[j].
The absence of this assumption would make it impossible to define the propagation
matrix.
v) To deal with loops, we assume that the input of the loop body is the same for all
the iteration steps (InL). The assumption is that, at each iteration, the same input will
be processed, and not the output of the previous iteration. This assumption is quite
realistic in composite processes, because loops often process the same input until the
required results are obtained (e.g. a reservation or a payment is iterated until success),
or the input is provided to the loop as aggregated data and processed one block at a
time.
vi) Due to the fact that the model should be finite, we fix the maximum number of
events that can be handled at the same time by an event handler. Thus, at most ne > 0
events can be handled together by the system. Even if this is an approximation, it is
important to remark that ne can be fixed arbitrarily large to best tune the tolerance,
without any significant impact on the algorithm complexity.
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5 FLATTENING BPEL PROCESSES
In this section, we detail the second step of our evaluation technique, and explain
how we obtain a flat workflow starting from the original BPEL composition. This
transformation is necessary for two reasons. The first reason is that it allows us to
provide unambiguous semantics for BPEL activities, and to clarify the complex control-
and data-flows that emerge when various compensation-, fault-, and event-handlers are
attached to nested scopes. The second reason is that the flat workflow is self-contained;
it includes all the information required to achieve the analysis, can be used with no
further elaboration, and is suitable for an automatic tool.
The following discussion is exemplified using a travel management application as a
running example.
5.1 A BPEL Primer
BPEL 2.0’s main constructs (called activities) can be classified as basic or structured. A
compact explanation is reported in Table II. It also highlights the graphical notation
adopted in the rest of the article to represent BPEL processes. Basic activities imple-
ment elementary steps of a process workflow. More specifically, <invoke>, <receive>,
and <reply> activities manage service interactions, while the <assign>, <validate>,
<wait>, <empty>, and <exit> activities are self-explanatory. Structured activities repre-
sent control-flow logic structures. <sequence>, <if–elseif–else>, <while>, <repeatUntil>,
and <forEach> are self-explanatory. The <pick> activity forces the process to wait for
the delivery of a message (<onMessage> construct) or a timeout expiration (<onAlarm>
construct) to perform the activities associated with the corresponding branch. Finally,
the <flow> construct introduces activities that have to be performed concurrently. The
designer can use a <scope> construct to define nested activities.
BPEL also provides designers with mechanisms, called handlers, for capturing and
dealing with special kinds of events, which we can classify as faults, needs for com-
pensation, or concurrent events. Fault handlers can be used to capture and deal with
runtime faults. They are defined through <catch> and <catchAll> constructs that are
associated to a <scope>. When a fault is caught, the <scope> is terminated, and the
corresponding handler is launched. If a fault is not caught by an appropriate handler,
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TABLE II
BPEL 2.0 basic (a) and structured (b) activities.
BPEL ac-
tivity Symbol Description
<assign> <Var. Name> assign values to variables
<validate>
Validate
<Var Name> validate the state of variables
<wait>
Wait
<sec.>
wait for the specified amount of
time
<invoke>
<WS Name>
<WS Name> synchronously (up) or
asynchronously (down) call a
partner WS
<receive> <WS Name> wait for a message
<reply> <WS Name> send a response message
<throw> Throw! raise a fault
<rethrow> Rethrow! re-throw a fault to the upper levelscope
<empty> do nothing
<exit> Exit immediately terminate the busi-ness process
(a)
BPEL ac-
tivity Symbol Description
<sequence> sequence of activities
<if>
<COND>
...b1 b2 bn
select exactly one activity from a
set of choices
<while>
<COND>
While
Body
loop structure
<repeat-
Until>
<COND>
RU
Body
loop structure
<pick>
<COND>
...b1 b2 bn
wait for one of several messages
to arrive or for a timeout to occur
<flow> ...b1 b2 bn concurrent execution of activities
<forEach>
<COND>
forEach
Body
loop structure
<scope>
FH
CH
TH
EH
<Scope Name>
define an execution scope
<compen-
sateScope>
Compensate
<WS Name>
start compensation on an inner
scope
<compen-
sate>
Compensate start compensation on all inner
scopes
(b)
it is re-thrown to an upper level. If the handler completes successfully, the control flow
returns to the activity that immediately follows the <scope>. Faults can also be thrown
using the <throw> construct. Compensation handlers are used to define compensation
logic, and they can only be activated for scopes that have completed successfully. They
are explicitly initiated using the <compensate> or <compensateScope> activities.
Finally, event handlers consist of business logic that can be activated concurrently
to the process’ main logic. The activities within a handler are triggered either by the
arrival of an inbound event message, or by a timed alarm.
Fig. 3 shows the BPEL process of a travel management service example. Once a request
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F*: All Remaining
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Fig. 3. The running example BPEL process model.
is received from the user and assigned to a local variable, a query on the user DB is
performed to retrieve user data. In the case of faults, the process immediately exits and
returns a fault code. Otherwise, the user request is processed by invoking a three-way
<flow>, in which the process concurrently elaborates the flight, hotel, and (optional) car
booking. The booking status can be checked by invoking the event handler specified by
the Booking <scope>. Each service involved in the processing can fail, thus each branch
is isolated from the others through a specific <scope>. The fault handlers associated with
the first two <flow> branches compensate the activities of the <scope> that are already
complete, and forward the fault to the upper layer. The third branch defines a fault
handler that masks faults so that they are not forwarded to the process, thus totally
isolating the branch from the process.
When the three subprocesses finish, the makePayments service is invoked. If there
are problems in the Payment, the fault handler associated with its <scope> tries to
recover the fault by nesting three levels of fault handlers, and by canceling the car
reservation in the case of wrong currency or insufficient credit. Finally, in the case of
successful payment, the shipping service is invoked (requestShipping) within its
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own <scope>, to isolate it and to mask faults that should not reach the process. Details
on the fault, compensation, and event handling can be found in [33].
5.2 BPEL Process to Flat Workflow
In this section, we will clarify how we flatten a BPEL process to a workflow that only
uses the three basic patterns of structured programming: (sequence, branch and loop), and
concurrency (fork-join). To explain the BPEL to workflow mapping, we can identify two
steps. First we detail how to map single BPEL activities into corresponding workflows.
Second, we describe how the whole workflow can be obtained by composing the single
activity workflows. The mapping rules and the algorithms that we obtain are then
applied to the running example.
5.2.1 Mapping BPEL Activities
BPEL flattening can be performed by extending and hierarchically applying the flatten-
ing rules that deal with single BPEL activities.
As shown in Table II, BPEL activities are split into two main classes: basic, and
structured. Basic activities such as <wait>, <invoke>, <receive>, <reply>, and <empty>
do not modify the process workflow so they can be considered as internal activities
that do not affect a process’ reliability. On the other hand, <assign> and <validate>
can trigger internal errors such as datatype mismatches, and therefore they need to be
considered as faulty activities.
Similarly, <throw> and <rethrow> activities are used in fault handling to manage
faults, and thus they can change the process workflow and its reliability; the same is
true for <compensate> and <compensateScope> activities.
The <exit> activity forces the process termination, thus impacting on the process
workflow. This effect implies that a BPEL process may have different possible outputs,
and therefore it is necessary to evaluate the probability of each of them.
Structured activities mainly implement control flow operations. Most of them (<sequence>,
<if>, <while>, <repeatUntil>, <forEach> , <pick>, and <flow>) do not specifically in-
volve any flattening operation, while further investigation is required for the <compensate>
and <scope> BPEL structured activities.
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TABLE III
BPEL 2.0 activities, and corresponding flat workflows.
<assign>, <validate>, <invoke>, <receive><wait>,
<empty>
<throw>,
<rethrow>,
<compen-
sateScope>
<reply>,
<exit> <sequence> <if>, <pick>
Act
Out?
p1
FH F1 FH F2 FH Fn FH F*
p2 pn p*
pok
Act
Act
Handler
A B
A
B
c
1-c
<while>,
<repeatUntil>,
<forEach>
<flow> <compen-sate> <scope>
1-c
c
A
T1
Tm
compensate
CH1
CHn
Scope 
Pattern
Event1?
EH1
pe1
End?
1-pe1
pl
1-pl
Wait()
Eventm?
EHm
pem
End?
1-pem
1-pl
Wait()
pl
<Scope> is a powerful BPEL construct, through which one can specify a context
influencing the execution behavior of its enclosed activities. Such contexts or <scope>s
can be nested hierarchically, while the root context is provided by the <process> itself.
In particular, a behavioral context includes variables, partner links, message exchanges,
correlation sets, event handlers, fault handlers, a compensation handler, and a termina-
tion handler.
Table III shows the flattened workflows that correspond to the BPEL 2.0 activities
we have discussed. Basic activities are represented by rounded rectangles, while thick
squared boxes represent subprocesses that are composed of the other activities, which
in turn can also be subprocesses. As for basic activities, we mainly characterize non-
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faulty activities (<wait>, <empty>) through a simple one input to one output activity.
Because they do not affect the BPEL workflow’s reliability, they are usually not reported
in the process workflow. Faulty activities (<assign>, <validate>, <invoke>,<receive>),
on the other hand, can generate faults due to internal errors (<assign>, <validate>) or
to external faults triggered by WS invocations. What we do in the flattening process
is to merge the WS behavior with the process’ interaction, i.e, we represent the WS as
embedded inside an <invoke> (in case of synchronous WS interactions) or a <receive> (in
case of asynchronous WS interactions). Thus, we can argue that <invoke> and <receive>
are intrinsically not faulty activities, but that they reflect the associated WS behavior.
The probabilities p1, p2, ..., pn, and pok shown in the faulty activity workflow are
related to the occurrence of a specific fault, or to the probability of a correct or latent
error output. To obtain these probabilities, we need to know the user profile input
probability vector, as we will see in Section 6.
<Throw>, <rethrow>, and <compensate> activities are considered as explicit invoca-
tions of specific FCT handlers, and therefore are represented accordingly. The <reply>
and <exit> activities are instead mapped as final activities that close the process. Struc-
tured activities are considered as specific patterns to be applied to basic activities, and
the corresponding flattened out workflows are reported in Table III. More specifically,
the <compensate> activity is mapped into a sequence of compensation handlers that
compensate the behavior of all the successfully completed scopes that are immediately
enclosed inside the scope associated with the FCT-handler. Finally, a <scope> is mapped
as a parallel activity with m+1 branches: the first m branches describe the event handling
and management of the corresponding events e1, .., em, while the last branch is related
to the <scope> subprocess mapping.
5.2.2 Obtaining the Workflow
Once the mapping of the BPEL elements has been completed, they are combined into
the flat workflow. The algorithms shown in Fig. 4 describe the actions that need to be
taken to obtain this workflow. Let us start by explaining the algorithm that deals with
the whole process, which is shown in Fig. 4a.
Each activity Act of a process or subprocess is elaborated through the Map(Act, ScopeHP )
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Act MapBasAct(Act,ScopeHP)
IsScope
N
Null
Basic + 
<compensate>
Structured
ApplyPattern(Act)
Y Update(ScopeHP)
Map(Act,ScopeHP)
Map(a.Act,ScopeHP) Map(ev.Act,ScopeHP)
a=Dequeue
(Act.List)
a==Null
a!=Null
ev==Null
ev!=Null
ev=Dequeue
(Act.EvList)
(a) Process
ApplyPattern(Act)
MapBasAct(Act,ScopeHP)
fcth=Dequeue
(Act.FCTH)
fcth==Null
Map(a,ScopeHP)
Link(Id) Id=QueryFCTH(fcth.id, ScopeHP)
Id==Null
Id!=Null
fcth!=Null
a=Dequeue
(fcth.ActList)
a==Nulla!=Null
ScopeHP= 
ScopeHP.parent
Act.type?
Throw/
Rethrow
Otherwise
Faulty? NY
(b) Activity
Fig. 4. The mapping algorithms.
function, according to whether it is basic or structured. ScopeHP is the scope hierarchy
path, i.e., the path in the scope hierarchy of the considered activity Act, which allows us
to determine the FCT handler workflows. In the case of basic or <compensate> activities,
the MapBasAct function of Fig. 4b is performed. If the structured Act is a <scope>, the
ScopeHP has to be updated with the addition of the new scope; if the scope has handlers
they too need to be recursively mapped using the Map function. If the structured Act
is not a <scope>, or if the <scope> event handler mapping loop is completed, a loop is
performed to map all the activities that are nested in the Act. Finally, the corresponding
workflow pattern, among those reported in Table III, is applied to the activities enclosed
within Act (as well as to the <scope> handler). This step completes the process workflow.
The MapBasAct(Act, ScopeHP ) of Fig. 4b maps basic or <compensate> activities into
the corresponding workflow. It starts by checking whether the considered activity Act
is faulty or not. Non-faulty activities that do not modify the input, i.e., with identi-
cal propagation matrices (internal activities such as <assign> and <validate>), except
<throw>, <rethrow>, <compensate>, and <compensatescope>, are immediately skipped.
The others are forwarded and processed as faulty activities.
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Thus, the workflow pattern associated with Act in Table III is applied, and the Act
handlers are mapped into the corresponding workflows. Because faults occurring to
activities within the same <scope>, or within the same ScopeHP , invoke the same
fault handlers, the fault handlers are mapped into the corresponding workflow the first
time they are invoked. The invocations on these fault handlers return the workflow
identifiers as pointers to the corresponding workloads. In case a fault handler in the
specific ScopeHP has not yet been invoked, the mapping is performed by considering
all the activities enclosed in the fault handler. This is why the two functions implement
a mutual recursion.
We have applied these algorithms to the running example shown in Fig. 3. Internal
errors and faults are usually much less frequent than WS errors and faults; therefore,
we assumed internal activities were error and fault-free. Thus, <assign> and <validate>
activities are not considered as faulty, and are not taken into account in the example.
This way, fault F5, which is related to a data mismatch and affects <assign> activities,
can be neglected, as it has a very low probability of occurring. The workflow only
includes the synchronous invokes, and the corresponding WS faults. By flattening the
running example’s BPEL, we obtain the workflow shown in Fig. 5. Because the main
process fault handlers ignore inner faults, they are represented as exit activities that
bypass the compensation handlers. Furthermore, event handling is considered to be
a request to check the Booking status at a certain time. Handling the faults trig-
gered by the makePayments service is more complex, because they also have nested
scopes and fault handlers. Their workflows are highlighted in Fig. 5. Specifically, the
makePayments invocation can throw 4 different faults: F1, F2, F3, and the generic
F ∗. The most complex one to manage is F1, as it may throw F2, F3, F ∗ (handled by
the makePayments calling <scope>), and F1 (handled by the process <scope>) faults.
Also, the F3 handler is nested because it may cause a generic fault F ∗ to be thrown to
the upper makePayments <scope>. Finally, F2 and F ∗ have simple fault forwarding
handlers that notify the fault to the end user. This example allows us to show how
we transform a complex, hierarchical, nested BPEL process into a flat workflow that is
ready to be evaluated.
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Fig. 5. Running Example process workflow.
6 SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS
Once we have obtained a flat workflow, we are ready to analyze it, taking into con-
sideration any faults and fault handlers, from both the end user’s and the architect’s
perspectives.
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6.1 Fault Handling
In BPEL processes, faults can be managed by ad-hoc handlers, which can therefore be
used to stop fault propagation. Fault handlers can be broadly categorized into forwarders,
and processors. The former simply manage the termination of the process, and send
the user a message containing the details of the fault. The latter implement some
specific recovery actions that can either be successful or require further fault handling.
A fault handler can be viewed as a subprocess that elaborates on the main workflow’s
information to recover from a fault. In terms of propagation effects, this approach results
in a feedback of the process input into the main workflow, after the fault has been
handled.
Thus, assuming In ∈ Rn is the input probability vector of the process, i.e. the usage
profile of Section 4, and that O ∈ Rn is its output probability vector, we can algebraically
express the process propagation as an input-output relationship by the function F (·)
O = F (In,P1, ..,Pm) (3)
where P1 , .., Pm are the propagation matrices of the m > 0 process activities, identified
by i = 1, ..,m. F : Rn ×Rn,n × ...×Rn,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
→ Rn returns an n-probability vector to obtain
output j ≤ n from input i ≤ n given that a response is provided, as stated in Section 4.
Because fault forwarders simply forward faults, they avoid input feedback. So, if all
the fault handlers in the process are fault forwarders, the function of (3) becomes
O = In · Feq(P1, ..,Pm) (4)
where Feq : Rn,n × ...×Rn,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
→ Rn,n returns the system equivalent matrix Peq = Feq(P1, ..,Pm).
The output is therefore linear with respect to the input. Hence, it could be obtained
through simple algebraic operations on the workflow, as shown in Section 6.2.
On the other hand, if there are one or more fault processors in the process, we have
input feedback, meaning that the relationship between input and output is not linear. In
other terms, in the case of fault forwarding, correct response or latent error flows and
faults are separated. Indeed, they are forwarded by the main workflow to the output
without being mixed. In the case of fault processing, some faults can be processed and
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recovered, so becoming correct responses or latent errors. This policy leads to fault and
correct or latent error flows being mixed in the propagation.
To adequately investigate and characterize the problem, let us start by considering a
generic faulty activity X = 1, ..,m−1, and its fault management. As stated above, we can
express the activity output probabilities as functions of the input OX = FX(InX ,PX) =
{pOX0 , pOX1 , ..., pOXnl , pOXnl+1 , ..., pOXnl+nf+1}. Table III shows that this characterization specif-
ically regards faulty activities, both internal (<assign>, <validate>), and external (syn-
chronous <invoke>, <receive>), where probabilities pF1 , pF2 , ..., pFnf correspond to pOXnl+1 ,
pOXnl+2
, ..., pOXnl+nf+1
, respectively, and pok =
∑nl
j=0 pOXj . To obtain the (X + 1)th activity
input (InX+1), following the Xth one, we have to know the X normalized output OX .
InX+1 = OX = {pOX0 /pXok, pOX1 /pXok, ..., pOXnl/p
X
ok, 0, ..., 0} = {
InX ·PXcl
pXok
,0} = {InX+1,0} (5)
where InX+1 = In
X ·PXcl
pXok
∈ Rnl+1, and therefore ∑nlj=0 InX+1[j] = 1.
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Fig. 6. Fault handler workflow pattern.
Fig. 6a shows a generic fault processing workflow, in which each fault is managed by
an explicit fault handler. Notice that inner faults and their handlers are collapsed into
the main fault handler. Nevertheless, the proposed solution can be inductively applied
to nested fault handlers, as we shall see. Our aim here is to obtain a simpler model, like
the one shown in Fig. 6b, which is equivalent to the one shown in Fig. 6a. To this end,
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we have to identify the pF1eq, .., pFnf eq, and pokeq probabilities of the equivalent model,
given the original model’s probabilities of faulty activity output (pFi for the generic
ith output), and of all output for each of the fault handlers, i.e. pFHjFk for the generic
kth output of the jth fault handler with i, j, k = 0, .., nf (conventionally, pF0 = pok,
pFHjF0 = pFHjok, and pFH0Fk = pokIn · P · In[k]). In other words, considering a generic
faulty activity X with propagation matrix PX , we want to obtain the equivalent model
characterized by PXeq, so that the output OX = F (In
X ,PX) of (3) is expressed as
OX = InX ·PXeq(InX),
just like in the case of fault forwarding.
There is a strong difference between this relationship and the one seen in (4), i.e.
PXeq(In
X) = FXeq (P
FH0, ..,PFHnf , InX), where PFH1, ..,PFHnf are associated to the fault
handlers of faults 1, .., nf , and PFH0 = In is the matrix that describes a fictitious handler
that manages a correct response, by just forwarding it. This way the aggregation-
reduction rules are still valid, and can be applied.
To obtain the simplified activity model of Fig. 6b, we have to express its probabilities
pF1e, ..., pFne, poke in terms of the original model probabilities and matrices. In the fault
processing we assume that the output of the faulty activity, before handling OX′ =
InX · PX , is forwarded to the fault handlers so that they can perform recovery, thus
propagating and reprocessing the normalized output OX′ , as in the normal workflow.
It follows that, given OFHj = OX′ · PFHj = {InX · PXcl · PFHjcl , InX · PXcl · PFHjf }, the
output of the whole faulty activity, including the fault processing, is OX = InX ·PXeq =∑nf
i=0 pFiIn
X ·PX ·PFHi = pokInX ·PX · In+pF1InX ·PX ·PFH1+ ..+pFnf InX ·PX ·PFHnf .
The first term (pokInX ·PX ·In) represents the WS output (InX ·PX), which is forwarded
to the workflow in case of correct response (pF0 = pok) through a fictitious fault handler
(PFH0 = In). This way the equivalent propagation matrix Peq can be expressed as
PXeq(In
X) = PX ·
(
pXokIn + p
X
F1P
FH1 + ..+ pXFnfP
FHnf
)
(6)
where pXok =
∑nl
i=0 In
X ·PX [i], pXFj = InX ·PX [j], and thus its dependence on InX .
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6.2 Aggregation/Reduction Rules
Once the BPEL process activities have been mapped to equivalent activities, we can
evaluate process parameters (< γP (In),PP (In) >) by applying the reduction algorithm
proposed in [25], which we have adapted for SOA and WS compositions, and specifically
for dealing with FCT and event handling, taking into account the fault processing
input feedback and its propagation on the main process workflow. In the following,
we provide reduction rules for all the BPEL structured activity workflow patterns,
considering just 2 sub-activities (A, and B) described, as specified in Section 4, by the
2-tuples < γA(In),PA(InA) >, and < γB(In),PB(InB) >, respectively. The formulae we
obtain can be easily generalized to n-sub-activity patterns by iteratively applying the
rules to reduced sub-activity couples, until we obtain a single equivalent component.
Both the user and the architect perspectives need to be considered to obtain the PPU ∈
Rn+1×n+1 and PPA ∈ Rn×n process propagation matrices based on those representing
the activities. Furthermore, from the architect’s perspective, the response probability
γP
A also depends on the process workflow, and requires further investigation. Indeed,
the probability of a specific workflow path has to take into account propagation effects,
and can therefore be expressed as a function of the WS fault probabilities, as discussed
in Section 6.1. The workflow equivalent is similar to the one shown in Fig. 7, where
pnext is the probability to continue the workflow, while pout is the probability to exit
due to a fault, where pnext + pout = 1, and therefore pout = 1 − pnext. Moreover, if γPA
represents the response probability of the equivalent system, it has to be expressed in
terms of the related parameters (γAA , and γBA in the case of two activities A, and B).
To this end, considering a generic process structured activity X , it is possible to
express γXA in algebraic terms by manipulating the propagation matrix PXA(InX)
PX
Aγ
(InX) =
 γXAPXAcl (InX) γXAPXAf (InX)
0nf×nl+1 Inf

thus obtaining the architect γ-propagation matrix PXAγ (InX). Note that PXAγ (InX) is a
non-stochastic matrix because the sum by row elements of rows 1, .., nl is equal to γX
A .
Hence, to obtain parameter γPA for the whole process, given the process input InP , we
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Generic
Wflow
Equivalent
pnext
pout
Previous 
Workflow 
Next 
Workflow 
Previous 
Workflow 
Next 
Workflow 
Out?
p1F1
Act1
p1Fnf p1ok
Out?
pkF1
Actk
pkFnf pkok
Generic 
Wflow
Fig. 7. A generic workflow equivalent.
have to evaluate its γ-propagation matrix PPAγ (InP ), and output vector so that
γP
A
=
n∑
i=0
InP ·PPAγ (InP ). (7)
Also, this parameter, from the architect’s perspective, depends on InP , i.e. γPA(InP ).
TABLE IV
Aggregation rules.
Pattern PP PP
Aγ
pnext
Seq PA ·PB PAAγ ·PBaγ pSnext = pAokpBok
If No exit branch pcP
A + (1− pc)PB
(1− pl)(In − plPAAγ (InL))−1 pCnext = pcpAok + (1− pc)pBokExit branch PA(InC) ·PBeq
Loop While (1− pl)(In − plP
A)−1 (1− pl)(In − plPAAγ )−1 pLnext =
pAok
1−plpAokRU (1− pl)PA · (In − plPA)−1 (1− pl)PAAγ · (In − plPAAγ )−1
Concurrent PF = 1
2
(PA(InF ) +PB(InF )) 1
2
(PA
Aγ ·PBAγ ) + 1
2
(PB
Aγ ·PAAγ ) pFnext = pAokpBok
Table IV shows the aggregation-reduction rules for the workflow patterns identified
in Section 5. These have been obtained by algebraic manipulations similar to those of
[4], [25]. Details can be found in [33].
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6.3 Solution Algorithm
O=EvaluateOut
(wf,In)
Synthesis(wf,In)
act=Dequeue
(wf.list)
act!=Nullact==Null
wf patternbasic structured
act.P,act.γ,In=
Synthesis(act,In)
wf.P,wf.γ,O=
ApplyPattern
(wf,wf.list.(P,γ))
P,γ=Evaluate 
Pars(wf,O)
Return
P, γ, O
wf.type
act.P,act.γ,O=
Synthesis(act,In)
Seq !Seq
Fig. 8. BPEL parameter evaluation algorithm.
The main synthesis algorithm for evaluating a BPEL process’ response probability
and propagation effects is shown in Fig. 8. It receives the flat workflow wf , and the
usage profile In as inputs; and returns γ, P representing the process from the required
perspective, and the corresponding output O. As discussed in Section 5, wf has to
include all the BPEL process’ activities and fault handlers. With regards to fault handlers,
they are considered by the algorithm as sequences containing the faulty activity and
the fault handler activities, as depicted in Fig. 6.
The algorithm starts by processing the input workflow, to evaluate if it is composed
of just a single basic activity, or if it is structured. In the latter case, we need to consider
the nested activities; the function is therefore recursively invoked on all of them. In
particular, if we have sequence patterns, the output of an activity becomes the input
to the next activity; otherwise, if we have a loop, fork-join or flow construct, the same
input is used for all the nested workflows and activities.
When all the nested workflows have been analyzed, ApplyPattern uses the above
specified formulae to compute the parameters and the output, starting from the param-
eters of the nested workflows. On the other hand, the outputs and parameters of basic
activities are evaluated by EvaluateOut and EvaluatePars, respectively. Finally, the
basic and structured algorithm branches are merged, and the results of the evaluation are
returned. Regarding the algorithm’s complexity, if a is the number of process activities,
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and n is the number of possible responses for an activity (correct, latent errors and
faults), it is easy to demonstrate that the asymptotic complexity of the Synthesis
algorithm is O(n2 ∗ a). In fact, EvaluateOut, EvaluatePars, and ApplyPatterns
are O(n2), because they implement just simple matrix operations. Synthesis, on the
other hand, implements a visit on the workflow, and has a linear complexity with respect
to the number of activities in the workflow O(a). Thus the algorithm is scalable on the
number of activities.
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis techniques have proven to be important tools for understanding and
identifying the critical components of a process. These techniques investigate how the
uncertainty in the output of a model can be apportioned to different sources of uncer-
tainty in the model’s inputs. In our specific context, an architect is primarily interested
in identifying the components or the WSs that have a high impact on the overall
process reliability or availability, or both. More specifically, the architect is interested
in understanding and quantifying the impact that each input (correct or erroneous) has
on the process.
One of the most powerful and effective sensitivity analysis techniques is differenti-
ation. It tells us how sensitive a given quantity, which can be expressed as a function
of some specific parameters F (x1, ..., xk, ...), is to these parameters. This technique is
achieved by differentiating the quantity function on the considered parameter xk
Sk =
δF (x1, ..., xk, ...)
δxk
.
Once we have obtained the process’ result parameters, we can apply sensitivity
analysis to investigate specific aspects and contributions. Starting from the Birnbaum
importance index [34], and considering a generic property function Y P , which can be
one among CP , EPj , GPj , and BPj as defined in Table I, the sensitivity of the Y P property
on the ith activity can be specified as
SiY =
δY P
δY i
.
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Applying pivotal decomposition, we can express the ith activity sensitivity on the Y
property as
SiY =
δY P
δY i
=
δ
(
Y iY P (1i) + (1− Y i)Y P (0i))
δY i
= Y P (1i)− Y P (0i).
We can therefore evaluate the above formula considering, for the ith component,
γi = 1 and Pi = In in case Y P (1i), and γi = 0 for Y P (0i).
7 DEPENDABILITY ASSESSMENT IN ACTION
How can we use the proposed technique to obtain valid information from both the
user’s and the architect’s perspectives? The users are mainly interested in selecting the
service that implements the needed functionalities, and that best fits their reliability
and availability requirements. They want to quantify these parameters, and this can
be done using < γPU , PPU >, as specified above. The architect’s goal is to select the
WSs to orchestrate based on their reliability and availability. We want to provide useful
information, such as the parameters < γPU , PPU >, and < γPA , PPA > that, in the case
of the architect, can be manipulated to investigate the impact that each component and
each response has on the process. To better clarify how to use the proposed technique,
we apply it to the example described in Section 5.
In the workflow of Fig. 5, we identified 3 latent errors, and 5 possible faults. Thus,
we represent a generic X process activity using the couple < γX ,PX >, where the
propagation matrix PX is a 9×9 square block matrix. This way, by applying the proposed
approach, we get the overall process formulae detailed in [33].
Once we have obtained the flat workflow, it is analyzed applying the rules and formu-
lae of Section 6. In the evaluation, we base the model parameters that characterize the
response probability on real values, which are taken from literature [31], [35] whenever
possible. In some cases (e.g., requestFlightChoice and makePayments) we used
real values taken from the experiments performed in [35]. Otherwise, we based these
parameters on the statistics presented in [31], which were related to generic WSs, thus
characterizing all the other WSs with the same value of γ.
The PPU and PPA that we obtained from our evaluation are reported in Table V; they
only differ in the dimensions, as discussed in Section 6.2. Although the model could be
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considered to be quite realistic, we are conscious that, to show the effectiveness of the
approach, it is better to assess the method in a real-world environment, and conduct
a series of comprehensive experiments. This effort is the first objective of our future
work: a full case study experimentation on a real process, in which we identify the
process and its WS components, measure and benchmark its reliability and availability
properties, and then apply the proposed technique to verify and validate the results.
TABLE V
< γP ,PP > of the BPEL example process.
Per-
spec-
tive
γP PP
Architect 0.925

0.584711 0.003217 0.00214947 0.0219415 0.131942 0.0434513 0.139091 0.0503504 0.0231472
0.201549 0.0234032 0.000983154 0.007376 0.507493 0.0181956 0.0553862 0.0274546 0.158159
0.201798 0.00147353 0.0230995 0.00738442 0.508207 0.0182301 0.0554871 0.0275532 0.156768
0.256276 0.00218176 0.00145807 0.0260913 0.249526 0.11463 0.079134 0.0573242 0.213379
0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1.

User 0.99
[
PP
A
01×n
0n×1 1
]
TABLE VI
Running example process aggregated parameters.
Error — Fault Id CP |EPj GPj BPj SEPj SFPj LEPj LFPj
0 0.540631 0.0252493 0.358733 0.530511
1 0.00297448 0.121995 0.186355 0.0293679 0.708891 0.00313543 0.130034
2 0.00198743 0.0401756 0.186585 0.0295483 0.70848 0.00216396 0.040367
3 0.0202874 0.128605 0.236957 0.0274898 0.660167 0.0200565 0.126504
4 0.0465546 0.0461966
5 0.0214022 0.0256449
An architect is mainly interested in investigating the process responses, using the
metrics of Table I, the example values for which are reported in Table VI. These responses
highlight a low process correctness (CP ∼ 0.54) that gets worse if we also consider the
input (LEP0 ∼ 0.53). We can also see that there is a high susceptibility to faults, not only
in the case of latent errors (SF Pj from about 0.66 of error 3 to 0.708 of errors 1 and
2), but also in the case of correct inputs (0.359). To identify which WS has the highest
impact on the process, we perform sensitivity analysis, as discussed in Section 6.4. We
focus on the two main parameters γP and CP . Table VII shows the importance indexes
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we obtained.
TABLE VII
Running example WS importance indexes.
WS — Par gUI gFO gHO gAO rFC rHC rAC bFC
γP 0.930523 0.756366 0.756366 0.354908 0.717285 0.717285 0.319374 0.679512
CP 0.571764 0.451097 0.451097 0.211154 0.428246 0.428246 0.190475 0.416454
WS — Par bHC bAC mP vBA gC CUA rS
γP 0.679512 0.287409 0.521171 0.00555751 0.0428233 0.0209602 0.392564
CP 0.416454 0.17666 0.509917 0.00378136 0.0311699 0.0122643 0.229536
These values tell us that the getUserInfo WS is the one with the highest impact
on the process. Other important WSs are makePayments, and the ones in the <flow>
concurrent workflow. Some of them have the same sensitivity because they are charac-
terized by the same γ and P values, as reported in [33].
Following the algorithm of Fig. 1, to improve γP and CP , the architect can decide to
modify the workflow, select alternative WSs, or both. We assume the architect decides
to select alternative WSs. Thus, following the directions provided by the sensitivity
analysis, the software architect replaces the getUserInfo and makePayments WSs
with two functionally-equivalent services that are characterized by higher response and
lower fault propagation probabilities.
TABLE VIII
< γP ,PP > of the BPEL example process in the new configuration.
Per-
spec-
tive
γP PP
Architect 0.935

0.741565 0.00361244 0.00242493 0.0411729 0.0968937 0.00973072 0.0319764 0.0524615 0.0201621
0.326115 0.0258343 0.00154305 0.0175611 0.407045 0.00738891 0.0221701 0.0327325 0.15961
0.326446 0.00193981 0.0253975 0.0171725 0.407705 0.00824158 0.0222164 0.0328311 0.15805
0.403161 0.00270911 0.00181959 0.038958 0.217619 0.0822477 0.0362229 0.0626021 0.154661
0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1.

User 0.99
[
PPP
A
01×n
0n×1 1
]
The new configuration is thus evaluated to quantify the impact the new WSs have
on the process’ parameters, as reported in Table VIII. Now γP = 0.934822, and CP =
0.693232; both parameters have been improved. If the architect is satisfied, the process
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is deployed; otherwise, the algorithm is reiterated until a satisfactory configuration is
identified.
8 DISCUSSION
After presenting the approach and experimenting with it, we discuss its limitations and
threats to validity.
Limitations - In Section 4, we presented six basic assumptions that we make in our
work. Here we will identify and evaluate the impact that these assumptions may have
on our proposed methodology.
The first three assumptions have to do with how we model the business process. They
state that container and inner service time-to-failures are statistically independent, that
the inner service time-to-response and time-to-failure are statistically independent, and
that branching activities can be probabilistically represented. These are quite typical
assumptions, and they are very common in literature [3], [4], [20], [21], [24], [25], [35].
The probabilities of executing conditional and loop constructs can be estimated by
applying program analysis techniques [36], [37], and by statically inspecting the BPEL
source code. Moreover, our experience with real systems [11], [13], [17], [18], [35] have
allowed us to assess that these assumptions are acceptable, and do not undermine the
quality of our model.
The fourth assumption regards the fact that input and output types should always
be distinguishable. Once again, this assumption is not about the business process itself,
but about how we create the business process’ model, and specifically about how to
characterize and classify inputs and outputs. Indeed, we need to be able to uniquely
assign each and every input and output type to a specific type category. In other words,
the latent errors and faults that can be taken into account by the proposed technique
should be univocally detectable from the output they produce. Therefore, it is impossible
for two different latent errors or faults to produce the same output.
The fifth assumption states that a BPEL loop should adopt the same input in each
iteration. For example, we can have a data structure that aggregates multiple sub-data,
and then have each iteration of the loop’s body be responsible for manipulating one of
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the sub-data. We cannot have a loop in which the outputs of an iteration i become the
inputs of iteration i+ 1.
Although this assumption is about the business process’s control- and data-flows,
it is actually quite realistic. Having such a loop construct would be quite common if
our goal were to develop an iterative algorithm. However, this condition is usually not
the case in business processes, given their high-level of abstraction. Instead, business
processes mostly use loops to perform a certain task multiple times on different data,
which can easily be aggregated to form a single input [38].
Finally, the sixth assumption regarded the fact that the number of parallel activations
of an event handler needed to be finite. Once again, this is an approximation we make
on the model. Should the software architect find that the fixed limit is undermining
the analysis, she can easily increase the limit, knowing that this will not impact the
algorithm’s performance.
Threats to Validity - Here we follow [39], where four kinds of threats to validity are
mentioned: construct, internal, conclusion, and external.
Regarding construct and internal validity, our goal is to define an approach for the
reliability-availability analysis of Web service compositions, orchestrated via the BPEL
workflow language. In this type of research, a frequent problem is the accuracy with
which the model represents the system. To this end, we used a workflow model, which is
the common way to reason about software qualities in Web services [25]. Some problems
that are shared with all architectural approaches are, for example, the possible lack
of knowledge about the real execution environment, and consequently the difficulty
in defining architecture parameters [40], [41]. Some methods have been defined in
the literature, mainly based on estimations backed up by measures taken from actual
software or from similar applications, and on estimations backed up by experience [26],
[40], [41], [42]. In our work, we used as much data as possible from real systems, to
defend our underlying assumptions and the values that the factor levels can take.
Regarding conclusion and external validity, instead of using a real system, which would
have been needed to support the latter, we have considered a non-trivial example. How-
ever, to make the approach as general as possible we based most of our assumptions
on real data.
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9 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method to analyze the reliability and availability of BPEL processes
that need to compose third-party services, which are characterized by multiple failure
modes, latent errors, and propagation effects. The approach also fully takes into account
the more advanced tools that the BPEL standard gives us to build reliable processes,
such as fault, compensation, termination, and event handlers. The method can be seen
as a tool that both architects and users can adopt, the former to reason about a process’
reliability and availability, especially in the early development stages, and the latter as
support for WS selection. We also fully developed a non-trivial case study in the area
of travel management, to illustrate the applicability and effectiveness of our approach.
The proposed technique can be improved along several directions. As we observed,
parallel compositions can have a variety of application-dependent semantics. We intend
to explore current industrial practices to identify the composition patterns that are
relevant in practice, and to provide a formal specification of their reliability attributes.
Furthermore, we plan to explore the impact of embedding time dependency in the
response probability function, relaxing the assumptions of Section 4. This development
would help us deal with timeouts, and allow us to automatically synthesize join syn-
chronization points that depend on the parallel branches’ response times. Finally, we
are currently improving the implementation of our methodology in the context of a
real-world testbed, to assess its effectiveness through a more comprehensive set of
experiments.
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